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INTRODUCTION
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 was
enacted following the controversial decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Servs. Co., where an interactive computer service provider was
held liable for a libelous message posted by a user on one of its financial
message boards.2 The court determined that the service provider was a
“publisher” of the libelous message for the purposes of state law because
it had engaged in screening and moderating of other objectionable posts
on its message boards but failed to remove the libelous message in
question.3 Because the service provider voluntarily self-policed some of
the user-generated content on its forum, the court held that the service
provider assumed liability, in a manner akin to a newspaper publisher, for
all messages on its bulletin board that defamed third parties.4
The decision in Stratton affirmed that, by screening some of those
posts, the service provider assumed liability for all content on its message
board. The message board in question received over 60,000 posts a day.5
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Professor Steve Tapia for his mentorship and incomparable wit. I also want to thank my loving family
for their unwavering support—particularly my grandmother, Yukie Robinson, without whom I could
not have come as far as I have. And finally, thank you to everyone at Seattle University Law Review
who worked tirelessly to refine my piece.
1. Pub. L. No. 104–104, 79, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996)).
2. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. May 24,
1995) (superseded by statute).
3. Id. at *4 (“PRODIGY has uniquely arrogated to itself the role of determining what is proper
for its members to post and read on its bulletin boards. Based on the foregoing, this Court is compelled
to conclude that for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action, PRODIGY is a publisher rather
than a distributor.”).
4. Id.
5. Id. at *3.
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As one court opined, “[t]he amount of information communicated via
interactive computer services is . . . staggering. The specter of tort liability
in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It
would be impossible for service providers to screen . . . for possible
problems.”6 The same court recognized that because only service
providers who voluntarily regulated at least some user-generated material
risked subjecting themselves to liability, service providers could avoid
liability by giving up moderating content altogether and simply acting as
blind hosts.7 By dissuading service providers from hosting and moderating
user-generated content, Stratton thus ran counter to the congressional goal
of facilitating the growth of online services that Americans were becoming
increasingly reliant upon for engagement with politics, education, culture,
and entertainment.8
Perturbed by the ramifications of imposing “tort liability on service
providers for the communications of others[,]”9 Congress responded to
Stratton by distinguishing the “provider or user of an interactive computer
service” from the “publisher or speaker of any information” in § 230 of
the CDA.10 To make this distinction clear, interactive computer service
providers were given safe harbor from liability for the content generated
by users of their services.11 Congress also extended this safe harbor to
service providers who, like the defendant in Stratton, engaged in some
degree of self-regulation.12
Congress recognized that “interactive computer services offer a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”13 For
that reason, Congress thought it was in the best interests of the United
States to abstain from intrusive government regulation that might
otherwise stifle the growth of the Internet as a “vibrant and competitive
free market” of various types of information and services.14

6. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
7. See id.
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 230(a)–(b), 110 Stat. 56.
9. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 230(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56.
11. Id. (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).
12. Id. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable
on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material . . . [or] any action taken to . . . make available to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material . . . .”).
13. Id. § 230(a)(3).
14. Id. § 230(b)(2).

2018]

Curtailing Online Service Provider Immunity

1055

Simultaneously, Congress sought to address concerns over the trend
of obscene or otherwise objectionable content proliferating the Internet;
namely, the lack of regulations on content accessible by children.15
In response, Congress declared in § 230 that the policy of the United
States would be to “remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies” that could be employed
by end users to screen material they deemed objectionable or
inappropriate.16 Section 230’s purpose was to maximize user control over
content, without regulating the existence of the content itself or forcing
service providers to accept liability for the objectionable actions of third
parties.17 As a result, the onus was placed on individuals, families, and
schools to screen content that they deemed objectionable, especially as it
pertained to children’s access to that content.18
However, in the decades that followed the codification of § 230, the
kinds of services that were available online continued to evolve, and
§ 230’s safe harbor was interpreted broadly, to shield many different types
of service providers from liability. This Note discusses one of the most
notable contemporary challenges to broad § 230 immunity: the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC.19 Part I provides an overview of the way that § 230
immunity has been applied in the absence of the Roommates.com holding.
Part II summarizes the Roommates.com ruling and evaluates the approach
taken by the Ninth Circuit in curtailing the broad application of § 230
immunity while still preserving the congressional intent. Part III addresses
some of the most pressing challenges to the Roommates.com holding and
considers alternatives that have been suggested by other advocates. Part
IV then makes a case that the extension of the Roommates.com holding is
the most effective means of achieving the congressional goals of § 230.
I.

APPLICATION OF § 230 IMMUNITY

Three elements are required for an entity to receive immunity from
tort liability under § 230: “the defendant must be a provider or user of an
‘interactive computer service’; the asserted claims must treat the defendant
as a publisher or speaker of information; and the information must be
provided by another ‘information content provider.’”20
15. Id. § 230(b)(4).
16. Id.
17. Id., § 230(b)(3).
18. Id.
19. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175
(9th Cir. 2008).
20. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
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Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.”21 This definition has been applied to a number of
contemporary online services, such as merchants,22 search engines,23 and
web hosts.24
However, immunity only extends to service providers and users
insofar as they act as an intermediary for third-party content and does not
apply when they act as information content providers themselves.25
Section 230 defines an “information content provider” as “any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.”26
To this end, the courts provide some guidance for what types of
conduct a provider or user of an interactive computer service may engage
in without accepting liability as a publisher or speaker of third-party
content. Archiving, caching, or simply providing access to offensive
content posted by third parties does not transform a service provider into
an information content provider.27 Additionally, efforts to self-regulate
offensive third-party content will not burden service providers with
liability, “even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted.”28
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).
22. See, e.g., Schneider, 31 P.3d at 43 (holding that Amazon’s ability to edit third-party posts
and claim licensing rights on the posted material did not transform Amazon into an information content
provider: “Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service
providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the selfpolicing is unsuccessful or not even attempted. . . . Amazon was not a content provider under the
allegations in Schneider’s complaint.”) (footnote omitted).
23. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 242 F.
App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that because Google only archived, cached, or simply provided
access to defamatory content created by third parties, it was an interactive computer service and not
an information content provider: “The defamatory statements . . . were created by users of USENET
and other internet users . . . . Google cannot be held liable for the claims of defamation, invasion of
privacy, and negligence alleged here.”).
24. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a web host was
immune from liability stemming from the publication of a defamatory message via his email listserv:
“There is, however, no need here to decide whether a listserv or website itself fits the broad statutory
definition of ‘interactive computer service,’ because the language of § 230(c)(1) confers immunity not
just on ‘providers’ of such services, but also on ‘users’ of such services.”) (superseded by statute).
25. See id.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012).
27. See, e.g., Parker, 422 F.Supp. 2d at 492.
28. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998).

2018]

Curtailing Online Service Provider Immunity
II.

1057

ROOMMATES.COM: OVERVIEW

While a service provider does not assume liability when it acts as a
passive conduit for a facilitating a third party’s unlawful behavior,29 the
Ninth Circuit has ruled that designing a service that actively facilitates
illegal content or conduct violates the limitations of § 230 immunity,
effectively transforming the service provider into an information content
provider.30
The website, Roommates.com,31 provided an online service
“designed to match people renting out spare rooms with people looking
for a place to live.”32 To accomplish this, Roommates.com asked users33
to create a profile for the service, which required users to “disclose [their]
sex, sexual orientation and whether [they] would bring children to a
household . . . [as well as state their] preferences in roommates with
respect to the same three criteria: sex, sexual orientation and whether they
will bring children to the household.”34 Answers to these questions were
not open-ended; users made a selection from drop-down menus,35
populated by options provided by Roommates.com, to indicate their
responses.36 This information was then used by the website’s search
engine; a tool that “limit[ed] the listings available to subscribers based on
sex, sexual orientation and presence of children” by hiding certain listings
based on those stated attributes and preferences.37
Secondarily, the site encouraged users to augment the information on
their profiles with an “Additional Comments” section that allowed users
to “[describe] themselves and their desired roommate in an open-ended
essay.”38 Whereas, the initial profile creation obliged users to select
29. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If Craigslist ‘causes’ the discriminatory notices, then so do phone
companies and courier services . . . , yet no one could think that Microsoft and Dell are liable for
‘causing’ discriminatory advertisements. . . . [The plaintiff] cannot sue the messenger just because the
message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”).
30. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1157
(9th Cir. 2008).
31. “[T]he company goes by the singular name ‘Roommate.com, LLC’ but pluralizes its
website’s URL.” Id. at 1161 n.2.
32. Id. at 1161.
33. The terms “users” and “subscribers” are used interchangeably in referring to people who
utilize the services offered by Roommates.com. Id. at 1162.
34. Id. at 1161.
35. Drop-down menus, as they function here, allow a user to select answers to questions only
from among options provided by the website. Id. at 1165 n.17.
36. Id. at 1165 (“For example, Roommate requires subscribers to specify . . . whether they are
‘Male’ or ‘Female[,]’ . . . whether there are currently ‘Straight male(s),’ ‘Gay male(s),’ ‘Straight
female(s)[,]’ or ‘Lesbian(s)’ living in the dwelling[,] . . . [and] whether they are willing to live with
‘Straight or gay’ males, only with ‘Straight’ males, only with ‘Gay’ males or with ‘No males.’”).
37. Id. at 1169.
38. Id. at 1161.
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responses to questions from a list of pre-constructed options, the
“Additional Comments” section allowed users to input any information
they wanted.39
Plaintiffs sued in federal court, alleging that Roommates.com’s
business violated the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA)40 and California
housing discrimination laws.41 The district court held that
Roommates.com was immune under § 230 of the CDA, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c), which was the issue on appellate review.42
The appellate court reversed the circuit court in part, holding that
Roommates.com was liable for claims arising from (1) the obligatory
components of profile creation and (2) the website’s search engine
parameters.43 However, Roommates.com did qualify for § 230 immunity
from liability arising from the “Additional Comments” section of the
website.44
A.

Majority Opinion

The appellate court emphasized the distinction that “[the grant of
§ 230 immunity] applies only if the interactive computer service provider
is not also an ‘information content provider,’ which is defined as someone
who is ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of’ the offending content.”45
The court recognized that “the term ‘develop’ could [be interpreted
broadly.] . . . But to read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of
[S]ection 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section
otherwise provides.”46 However, the court was also concerned that
restricting the term “development” as applying “only to content that
originates entirely with the website—as the dissent would seem to
suggest—ignore[d] the words ‘development . . . in part’ in the [statute.]”47
To strike a balance that granted § 230 immunity to “passive conduits”
while leaving out genuine “co-developers” of content, the court interpreted
the term “development” as referring “not merely to augmenting the
content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged
unlawfulness.”48
39. Id. at 1174.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (1968).
41. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1169.
44. Id. at 1173–74.
45. Id. at 1162 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)).
46. Id. at 1167.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1167–68.
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As such, the court held that Roommates.com was liable for claims
arising from the profile creation and search engine components of its
service because the cultivation and dissemination of the offensive material
produced via these components was “a collaborative effort between
Roommate and the [user].”49 The court noted that while the users
themselves are obviously liable as content providers, this “does not
preclude Roommate from also being an information content provider by
helping ‘develop’ at least ‘in part’ the information in the profiles.”50
In addressing why Roommates.com was liable for the basic profiles
of its users, the court highlighted that users were obliged to identify their
sex and sexual orientation (and preferences in prospective roommates or
tenants) via “a limited set of pre-populated answers” that Roommates.com
had curated.51 Therefore, in creating a profile that displayed discriminatory
preferences, users were only responding to questions in a manner that
Roommates.com expressly required for use of its service.52 Consequently,
Roommates.com “[became] much more than a passive transmitter of
information provided by others; it [became] the developer, at least in part,
of that information.”53
Meanwhile, the court also held that Roommates.com was liable for
the effects of its search engine because its search engine “differs materially
from generic search engines such as Google . . . in that Roommate
designed its system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the
results of each search, and to force users to participate in its discriminatory
process.”54 In further distinguishing Roommates.com’s search engine
from more generic engines, the court stated that “Roommate’s search is
designed to make it more difficult or impossible for individuals with
certain protected characteristics to find housing—something the law
prohibits. By contrast, ordinary search engines do not use unlawful criteria
to limit the scope of searches conducted on them[.]”55
However, the court did grant § 230 immunity as it pertained to
liability arising from the “Additional Comments” section of user profiles
because that section “[came] entirely from subscribers” and was not
influenced in any way by Roommates.com.56 Although the “Additional
Comments” section of profiles often contained incredibly offensive and

49. Id. at 1167.
50. Id. at 1165.
51. Id. at 1166.
52. Id. at 1161.
53. Id. at 1166.
54. Id. at 1167.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1173–74.
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provocative language,57 Roommates.com did not “encourage or enhance
any discriminatory content created by users”; instead, Roommates.com
only offered a “simple, generic prompt” that users were free to answer in
any manner.58
B.

Concerns of the Dissent

In responding to the majority’s holding, the dissent in
Roommates.com foremost characterized the majority as offering an
“unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet service providers [that
would threaten] to chill the robust development of the Internet[,]”59 setting
the Ninth Circuit “apart from five [other] circuits, contravene[ing]
congressional intent[,] and violat[ing] the spirit and serendipity of the
Internet.”60
In addition to taking issue with the majority’s apparent rogue
expansion of liability for a number of service providers, the dissent
criticized the majority for offering a confusing and inappropriate metric
for deciding when a service provider has contributed materially to the
illicit content in question.61 The dissent claimed that “the majority’s
immunity analysis is built on substantive liability . . . depend[ing] on
whether a webhost materially contributed to the unlawfulness of the
information.”62 According to the dissent, this is the wrong inquiry, and the
majority must first answer whether “substantive liability may be reached
in the first place.”63
Moreover, the dissent emphasized the impracticality of attempting to
extend liability in the way described by the majority, noting that many
“websites use prompts and drop-down menus . . . . Some of these sites are
innocuous while others may not be. . . . But that is not the point. The
majority’s definition of ‘development’ would [mean] . . . [v]irtually every
site could be responsible in part for developing content.”64 Specifically,
the dissent questioned the efficacy of the majority’s supposed carve out
for providers of neutral tools, such as Google, noting that “Google is more
than a match engine: it ranks search results, provides prompts beyond what
57. Id. at 1173 (“Subscribers provide a variety of provocative, and often very revealing, answers.
The contents range from subscribers who ‘[p]ref[er] white Male roommates’” to “those who are ‘NOT
looking for black Muslims.’” (alterations in original)).
58. Id. at 1174.
59. Id. at 1176 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1177.
61. Id. at 1176 (“[I]nteractive service providers [would be] left scratching their heads and
wondering where immunity ends and liability begins.”).
62. Id. at 1182–83.
63. Id. at 1183.
64. Id.
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the
user
enters,
and
answers
questions.
In
contrast,
Roommate . . . searches information and criteria provided by the user, not
Roommate. It should be afforded no less protection than Google, Yahoo!,
or other search engines.”65
C.

Majority Response and Clarification

The majority rebut the dissent’s argument that the holding threatened
to “chill the robust development of the Internet[,]”66 by reasoning that the
interpretation of the term “develop” was not as broad and expansive as the
dissent asserted.67 In response to the dissent’s attempt to construe the term
“develop” to exclude service providers like Roommates.com from
liability, the majority argued that “[t]he dissent makes no attempt to
explain or offer examples as to how its interpretation of the statute leaves
room for ‘development’ as a separate basis for a website to lose its
immunity” despite being advised by the Supreme Court that redundancy
or duplication of terms should be avoided whenever possible.68
To further assuage the fears of the dissent, the majority articulated
several examples of when a service provider does or does not “develop”
content, at least in part, within the construction recognized by the Ninth
Circuit.69
First, when a third party uses “an ordinary search engine[, like
Google,] to query for a ‘white roommate,’ the search engine has not
contributed to any alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct;
providing neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit
searches does not amount to ‘development’ for purposes of the immunity
exception.”70 Roommates.com did not merely provide neutral tools in that
its search engine was designed in a way to specifically reinforce and
facilitate discriminatory renting, thereby contributing materially to the
development of offensive content.71
Second, “a dating [or other similar] website that requires users to
enter their sex, race, religion and marital status through drop-down menus,
and . . . [allows searches] along the same lines, retains its CDA immunity
insofar as it does not contribute to any alleged illegality[.]”72
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1176.
67. Id. at 1168 (majority opinion).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1169.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1172 (“By sharp contrast, Roommate’s website is designed to force subscribers to
divulge protected characteristics and discriminatory preferences, and to match those who have rooms
with those who are looking for rooms based on criteria that appear to be prohibited by the FHA.”).
72. Id. at 1169.
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Roommates.com failed to retain immunity because its drop-down menu
options and searching criteria were alleged to have violated the FHA.73
Third, “a housing website that allows users to specify whether they
will or will not receive emails by means of user-defined criteria . . . [is]
immune, so long as it does not require the use of discriminatory criteria.”74
Again, Roommates.com required users to input discriminatory criteria in
a user’s roommate preferences as a prerequisite for utilizing its service.75
Finally, a website that “edits user-created content—such as by
correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for length—retains
[its] immunity for any illegality in the user-created content, provided that
the edits are unrelated to the illegality.”76 However, the court clarified that
a website that edits third-party content in a manner that does contribute to
the illegality of the content by “transform[ing] an innocent message into a
libelous one[,] is directly involved in the alleged illegality and thus not
immune.”77 Hence, Roommates.com was not liable for the “Additional
Comments” portions of user profiles because it had not edited any thirdparty content or provided guidelines to constrain what could be
published.78
III.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXTENDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN
ROOMMATES.COM

Many advocates of broad § 230 immunity have questioned the
viability of extending the majority holding in Roommates.com for fear that
such an extension would curtail broad immunity at the expense of the
status of the internet as an open platform for innovation. Several
alternatives have been proposed that claim to better balance concerns of
unchecked immunity without rendering § 230 wholly inefficacious,
including: (1) the adoption of bad faith exceptions,79 (2) the
reclassification of service providers based on whether or not they engage
in business through the internet as distributors,80 and (3) the recognition

73. Id. at 1172.
74. Id. at 1169 (second emphasis added).
75. Id. at 1172.
76. Id. at 1169.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1173–74 (“Roommate publishes these comments as written. It does not provide any
specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does it urge subscribers to input
discriminatory preferences. . . . This is precisely the kind of situation for which [S]ection 230 was
designed to provide immunity.”).
79. See generally David Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency
Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371 (2010).
80. See generally Joey Ou, Note, The Overexpansion of the Communications Decency Act Safe
Harbor, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 455 (2013).
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that § 230 only provides immunity insofar as the CDA does not conflict
with the FHA or the stated purpose of the legislature.81
A.

Bad Faith Exception

One author posits that an effective solution would be to create a bad
faith exception that “would prevent websites and [internet service
providers] from asserting [S]ection 230 immunity if they acted
unreasonably in either posting or failing to remove defamatory content.”82
The author supports this solution because “courts evaluating [S]ection 230
claims usually refuse to inquire into the behavior of the Internet entity
hosting allegedly defamatory content.”83 Although the author
acknowledges that “subjective intent will often be implicit in a
determination of a web entity’s acting in bad faith,” he asserts that “an
objective bad faith standard is more comprehensive and easier to
administer.”84 To this end, he proposes that we look to Wisconsin
insurance law,85 where objective bad faith is analyzed under a
reasonableness standard.86 He suggests that “adapted for purposes of
defamation law,” a website or ISP could be held to act in bad faith if it
“either allows defamatory content postings or fails to remove them once
notified.”87 He further clarifies that “while this language sounds of
negligence, the bad faith standard would rely on affirmative acts such as
failure to remove an obviously defamatory posting, making the effective
level of culpability higher[,]” allowing courts to take a more holistic
approach where they “apply this flexible standard based on all of the
circumstances of the case before deciding whether the website or ISP is
entitled to [S]ection 230 immunity.”88
Applying this concept to Roommates.com, the author notes that “the
court indicated that there are limits to the control that websites may have
over third-party content if they are to claim [S]ection 230
immunity. . . . Roommates suggests that courts may be willing to police
the boundaries of [S]ection 230 immunity, and that a bad faith exception
does not present a great doctrinal obstacle.”89 As such, sites like
81. See generally Jennifer C. Chang, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implication
of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2002).
82. Lukmire, supra note 79, at 407.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 408.
85. Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376–77 (Wis. 1978). “[B]ad faith can be
alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying the claim . . . . ” Id. at 377.
86. Lukmire, supra note 79, at 408.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 408–09.
89. Id. at 408.
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Roommates.com would be held liable as bad faith actors if they “[seem]
to invite defamatory content[,]” especially when the sites have “apparent
awareness of the offending material.”90
However, a bad faith standard is only efficacious insofar as a plaintiff
can demonstrate that the service provider in question had knowledge of
and failed to act appropriately with respect to unlawful content posted by
a third party.91 Because the author suggests that liability would only be
extended to situations where the service provider allows defamatory
content or fails to remove it “once notified,”92 service providers would
have to either (1) implement a reporting system, or (2) actively police
content. Little consideration is given to the costs associated with both
options. A service provider would need to employ moderators in
proportion to the amount of user-generated content. With the staggering
breadth of daily user submissions on highly trafficked websites, it is
difficult to imagine most companies being able to employ enough
moderators to review all the content. Ultimately, a bad faith standard
would likely prove to be cost-prohibitive to all but the largest of service
providers dealing in the facilitation of third-party activities.
Moreover, the author concedes that this method “would necessarily
result in higher litigation costs for defendants”; although, he argues that
“courts could still impose . . . sanctions to discourage frivolous claims
while preventing online entities from ‘abusing’ CDA immunity.”93 Even
assuming that such sanctions would be sufficient to curtail frivolous
claims, it is not difficult to imagine that a bad faith exception would
intimidate several smaller service providers due to the tangible prospect of
facing extended litigation over whether a particular piece of third-party
content is “obviously defamatory.”94
B.

Reclassification Based on Engagement in Business as a
Distributor

Another author proposes that a solution may be “to treat ISPs and
websites that conduct business through the Internet as distributors[,]” with
service providers qualifying for immunity based on their level of Internet
connectivity.95 He suggests using the three categories discussed in Zippo
Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.:96 (1) websites that
clearly do business over the Internet, (2) websites where a user can
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 409.
94. Id.
95. Ou, supra note 80, at 468–69.
96. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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exchange information with the host, and (3) websites that simply post
information.97 He envisions that the first category will not qualify for
§ 230 protection, the second category will not qualify for immunity “if
there is enough interactivity and the exchanged information is of a
commercial nature[,]” and the third category will only qualify “if the
information was not solicited or where the ISPs or websites knew or
should have known the information was defamatory or against protected
civil rights.”98
This approach is focused on addressing the chilling effect of
widespread liability by only applying liability to service providers with a
commercial stake in the transaction of third-party content. The author
argues that “if a website generates income through user provided content
or if its revenue is based on viewership of third party content,” then it
should not qualify for § 230 immunity because “[t]hese websites are
profitable, and the additional cost imposed by distributor liability would
not cripple their growth.”99 As such, the author contends that this model,
as applied to Roommates.com, would preserve the Ninth Circuit holding
that Roommates.com would not qualify for § 230 immunity “because it
would be classified [under the first category,] as a website clearly doing
business on the Internet.”100
However, this method neglects to address liability for third-party
content on websites operated for non-commercial purposes, and it assumes
that the majority of offensive third-party content is necessarily tied the
financial benefit of the service provider. While this method may find
solvency in instances like Roommates.com where the website clearly
operates as a business,101 it ignores other service providers that choose not
to monetize.
The author predicates his proposal on the assumption that most
service providers are profitable enough to afford self-regulation, but his
solution invariably encumbers service providers who do not generate
enough income from their service to sufficiently reinvest in selfregulation.102 This solution ignores whether the service provider is actually
capable of using its decidedly modest income to reinvest in something as
97. Ou, supra note 80, at 469.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
102. Ou, supra note 80, at 469 (“Therefore, if a website generates income through user provided
content or if its revenue is based on viewership of third party content, then it does not qualify for
section 230 immunity and would be required to self-monitor. These websites are profitable, and the
additional cost imposed by distributor liability would not cripple their growth.”).
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resource intensive as self-regulating content. Thus, a message board that
only generates nominal revenue via advertisements or subscription fees
would be accepting liability simply for monetizing regardless of how
much profit it made. At the same time, a non-commercial message board
that acts as a haven for hate speech would not incur liability, simply
because it elects not to generate revenue. This disparity incentivizes
service providers who anticipate the possibility of offensive third-party
content to either (1) provide their service free of charge or (2) pass on the
cost of self-regulation to users. The former means that this solution fails
to address some of the more pernicious instances of service providers
facilitating defamatory third-party content; the latter means that this
solution ultimately hurts the market viability of several services,
potentially hamstringing further innovation and development.
C.

Giving the FHA Effect, Absent Irreconcilable Conflict or
Legislative Comment

Finally, one author specifically addresses the issue of whether the
CDA-created exceptions to FHA liability are valid, by looking at the way
that federal courts treat other conflicts between two federal statutes.103
This solution intends to achieve an appropriate balance by attempting to
give effect to Congress’s stated intentions both when it enacted the CDA
and the FHA.
She argues that “the approach taken by federal courts confronting
potential conflicts between two federal statutes in other contexts suggests
that both statutes must be given effect if possible[,]”104 citing a case in
which the Supreme Court evaluated the facial conflict between two pieces
of federal legislation to determine if one impliedly appealed the other.105
There, the Court held that “[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
regardless of the priority of enactment.”106 In instances where two statutes
can be construed as to permit them to coexist, “it is the duty of the courts,
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective.”107
As applied here, she contends that “we should interpret the CDA to
abrogate the FHA only if there has been a clearly expressed congressional
103. Chang, supra note 81, at 1001–02.
104. Id. at 1002.
105. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)). In Morton, the Court stated that
“[a] provision aimed at furthering Indian self-government by according an employment preference
within the BIA for qualified members of the governed group can readily co-exist with a general rule
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race.” Morton, 417 U.S. at 550.
106. Morton, 417 U.S. at 550–51.
107. Id. at 551.
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intention of such, or if the substance and goals of the two statutes are such
that we cannot preserve them both.”108 Ostensibly, such a standard could
be applied to virtually any federal statute that may come into conflict with
the CDA. Regarding the conflict between the FHA and CDA, the author
observes that “a legal regime that allow[s] the Internet to become a safe
haven for housing discrimination could have disastrous consequences for
the important goals that Congress put on the national agenda in 1968[,]”109
when the FHA was codified. She reasons that “Congress could not have
intended, in [later] passing the CDA, to undermine these monumental
commitments with nary a discussion of the possible consequences.”110
Thus, the author posits that silence as to congressional intent to limit the
reach of the FHA should be interpreted to mean that the CDA does not
dilute the FHA’s applicability.111
However, this solution is limited by whether congressional intent in
any given instance can be reasonably surmised. Furthermore, while there
is no record of congressional intent as to the CDA’s specific effect on the
applicability of the FHA, it is disingenuous to say that Congress was
entirely mute on the broader issue of resolving conflicts between the CDA
and other federal statutes. In fact, Congress expressly exempts certain
areas of law, such as intellectual property law and federal criminal laws,
from the scope of § 230 immunity.112 As such, extrapolating meaning from
silence as to applicability of the FHA, when Congress explicitly discussed
other federal statutes, is a precarious endeavor.
In codifying § 230, Congress stated that one of its policy goals was
“to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.”113 Congress further elaborated later in the
same policy statement that it sought to ensure the “vigorous enforcement
of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”114 Altogether, this
language may indicate congressional intent to favor the CDA in
irreconcilable conflicts with other legislation, except where the conflicting
legislation pertains specifically to the enumerated evils of obscenity,
stalking, and harassment. This language can also be interpreted to mean
108. Chang, supra note 81, at 1002.
109. Id. at 1001.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1003 (“The complete legislative silence as to the potential interaction between § 230
and the FHA compels a conclusion that there was no clear or manifest congressional intent that § 230
should limit the applicability of the FHA’s advertising provisions to OSPs.”).
112. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (1996).
113. Id. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added).
114. Id. § 230(b)(5).
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that Congress did not intend to limit the FHA and similar federal statutes,
but it instead intended to curtail the applicability of federal laws that would
otherwise impose liability on service providers for facilitating other types
of criminal acts.
Moreover, treating congressional silence as implicit evidence of
congressional intent may generate confusion amongst service providers as
to which federal statutes apply to them. Without the resources necessary
to sift through lengthy legislative histories for evidence of explicit or
implicit congressional intent, new and innovative service providers may
be deterred from entering the marketplace.
IV.

EXTENSION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING

Extending the holding in Roommates.com should be preferred to
other alternatives because the holding provides a judicially manageable
scheme for discerning between distinct types of service providers and
apportioning liability consistent with the congressional intent of § 230.115
While service providers should continue to receive immunity from
liability when passively interacting with third-party content, immunity
should not extend to service providers who, by making material
contributions to offensive third-party content, become information content
providers themselves. Promulgating the scheme articulated in
Roommates.com would ensure that courts, armed with an effective method
for categorizing defendants, are consistent in their approach to assigning
liability. This would in turn ensure that service providers are wellinformed as to the kinds of activities that will compromise their immunity.
In Roommates.com, the court identified two terms that could be used
to classify service providers and make future cases more judicially
manageable: “passive conduits” and “co-developers.”116 The use of these
terms would create a categorical distinction between service providers that
merely provide neutral tools and service providers that have “materially
contribut[ed]”117 to allegedly unlawful content. The former would receive
§ 230 immunity as a passive conduit for any illicit third-party content; the
latter would be liable for third-party content as co-developers.118
The Roommates.com holding does not define a material contribution;
however, a “material contribution” should be defined as (1) any action on
the part of the service provider that modifies the substance of third-party
content, such as to alter its original meaning to turn it from something
115. Id. § 230(b)(1).
116. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167
(9th Cir. 2008).
117. Id. at 1167–68.
118. Id.
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innocuous into something illicit, and (2) any aspect of a service that
necessarily obliges users to engage in illicit commentary or actions via the
service. For example, Roommates.com materially contributed to thirdparty content because it required users to list discriminatory preferences.119
In this way, materiality would be measured in a way consistent with the
myriad examples articulated by the majority opinion.120 Through those
illustrations, the majority exemplified a desire to hold service providers
accountable when they offer tools engineered to make illicit content a
virtually certain consequence of their use, as well as when service
providers modify third-party content to the extent that it transforms the
original meaning of the content.121
To that end, the proposed definition of “material contribution” would
ensure that § 230 affords immunity to a wide audience of service providers
seeking to provide neutral tools, while precluding service providers that
contribute in a “direct and palpable”122 way to the creation of illicit
content. Service providers will thus be emboldened to continue developing
societally beneficial online services, while active participants in the
creation of offensive content will no longer elude liability due to the
overbroad application of § 230.
Applying the standards articulated in Roommates.com to a case like
Stratton illustrates the propriety of relying upon “material contributions”
to decide whether § 230 immunity should apply. Under an extension of the
Roommates.com holding, the defendant in Stratton would receive § 230
immunity because it did not modify the substance of the offensive thirdparty message board posts, nor did any aspect of its service oblige thirdparty users to generate offensive content. Moreover, the defendant would
not be penalized for attempting to engage in self-regulation of third-party
content, thereby encouraging other service providers to engage in selfregulation by assuaging any apprehension that they might lose § 230
immunity by doing so.
This outcome is better aligned with the congressional intent of § 230
than probable outcomes that would result from the other proposed
alternatives discussed in Part III. For example, the defendant in Stratton
would potentially suffer liability under a bad faith exception regime
because the defendant engaged in some self-policing of content and “held
itself out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its

119. Id. at 1161.
120. Id. at 1169.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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computer bulletin boards.”123 This outcome would suggest to other service
providers that § 230 immunity is best secured by foregoing self-regulation
entirely to avoid notice of offensive content.
Similarly, the defendant in Stratton would likely incur liability under
an approach categorizing service providers based on their engagement in
online business. Because classification under that type of regime
necessarily turns on the service provider’s profitability, the defendant in
Stratton would be held liable for posts on its message board, assuming the
message board was generating income. This result is problematic because
it forces service providers to choose between redirecting profits towards
extensive self-regulation measures or abandoning commercial aspirations
entirely. Particularly for newer startups, the inability to reliably monetize
a service without incurring liability may cause innovation to stagnate as
entrepreneurs see less opportunity for profit. Only established economic
juggernauts could possibly hope to take on the burden of self-regulation
without crumbling financially. Comparatively, the method adopted in
Roommates.com would enable all passive conduits to profit and utilize
their earnings freely without opening themselves up to liability, allowing
even modestly sized service providers to find success and contribute to a
more diverse marketplace of online services.
While the dissent in Roommates.com prophesizes “doom and gloom
for countless Internet services[,]” the majority’s holding is consistent with
the intent of Congress “to preserve the free-flowing nature of Internet
speech and commerce without unduly prejudicing the enforcement of
other important state and federal laws.”124 As the majority articulated,
“[T]he message to website operators is clear: If you don’t encourage illegal
content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content,
you will be immune.”125 Service providers seeking to create neutral tools
should feel secure in their ability to operate without fear of incurring
liability from the actions of third-party users.
CONCLUSION
Until the United States Supreme Court offers a definitive answer on
applying § 230 immunity, it is incumbent upon the circuit courts to
evaluate the diverse options available to them and to incorporate some
mechanism for narrowing the scope of § 230 to prevent abuse of the
considerable immunities afforded by it. Roommates.com should be
extended to provide that necessary mechanism because it best reflects the
123. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. May 24,
1995) (superseded by statute).
124. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175.
125. Id.
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congressional motivations that drove the codification of § 230 in the
aftermath of Stratton.
The line drawn should not be one based on the service provider’s
knowledge or intent, as consideration of those factors will tend to
incentivize service providers to forego attempts at monitoring and selfregulating offensive content. Nor should liability turn on the financial
viability of the service in question, as applying liability in this manner
would penalize well-intentioned service providers that generate a menial
profit while affording protections to non-profit service providers that
create safe havens for illicit conduct.
Rather, liability should turn on whether there was a material
contribution that implicates the service provider as an active participant in
the generation of illicit content. A material contribution should be defined
as (1) any action on the part of the service provider that modifies the
substance of third-party content, such as to alter its original meaning to
turn it from something innocuous into something illicit, and (2) any aspect
of a service that necessarily obliges users to engage in illicit commentary
or actions via the service. Using material contributions as the determining
factor affords immunity to all passive creators of neutral tools—such as
those enumerated by the majority in Roommates.com—and ensures that
immunity will end at the point where service providers create tools that,
by their design, obligate third-party users to create offensive material. In
this way, the “vibrant and competitive free market”126 valued by Congress
can be preserved, and the treatment of the Internet as a unique venue for
innovation can continue unfettered by excessive regulation.

126. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012).

